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Economic Due Process and the Takings
Clause
John A. Humbach*
I. Introduction
The fifth amendment contains two express provisions for
the protection of property: No person may be "deprived of...
property, without due process of law; nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation."1 As
two separate pieces of constitutional text, the due process
clause and just compensation clause appear, prima facie at
least, to represent two separate, albeit related, constitutional
requirements. While "due process of law" requires that prop-
erty deprivations meet certain criteria of general legality, pro-
cedural or substantive,' the just compensation requirement is,
* John A. Humbach, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law,
Pace University School of Law, B.A. 1963, Miami University (Ohio), J.D. 1966,
Summa Cum Laude, Ohio State University.
1. U.S. Const. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment contains a similar due pro-
cess clause, which is expressly binding upon the states. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
While the fourteenth amendment does not repeat the fifth amendment's requirement
of just compensation in haec verba, the Supreme Court imposes the just compensa-
tion requirement against the states as an interpretation of the fourteenth amend-
ment's due process clause. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
226, 235-41 (1897).
2. The word process in the term "due process" most directly denotes a require-
ment that proper legal procedures be observed. However, the due process concept has
come to include criteria of a substantive nature as well.
The theoretical basis for substantive due process proceeds from the idea that
there are "limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go." Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887). If a legislative action is outside the general grant of legisla-
tive power, the action would be a nullity, not a proper legal procedure as required by
procedural due process. A property deprivation effectuated on the "authority" of such
an ultra vires action, lacking a proper procedural foundation, would be a deprivation
"without due process of law" in the procedural sense. Accordingly, with a government
of limited powers, a requirement of so-called substantive due process follows from a
requirement of procedural due process. See id. and infra text accompanying notes 4-
14.
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more simply, a "self-executing" duty to pay.'
In Supreme Court cases decided during the past ten
years, there have been two major developments in the way
that the just compensation requirement is applied. First,
there have gradually crystallized two fairly fixed verbaliza-
tions of the factors or tests which determine whether or not a
particular governmental action constitutes a "taking" of prop-
erty within the meaning of the just compensation require-
ment. Secondly, the Court appears to be increasingly willing
to review whether legislative acts regulating private property
are rationally justifiable in terms of their ostensible public
purpose - and to overturn those which are not. The just
compensation requirement, particularly as defined in the
newly verbalized factors and tests, has provided the constitu-
tional basis for this renewed judicial review of legislative
rationality.
The discussion which follows will examine the new
verbalizations repeatedly employed in Supreme Court takings
decisions of the past decade and the Court's enlistment of the
just compensation requirement as a basis for undertaking sub-
stantive review of legislation. As an introduction, the distinc-
tive historical roles and roots of the substantive due process
and just compensation requirements will be reviewed.
II. Substantive Due Process Limitations on the Regulation
of Property
For a time, the Constitution's due process mandates were
viewed as encompassing only issues of procedure." By the end
of the nineteenth century, however, the due process concept
was recognized to require also that exercises of legislative
power meet certain substantive standards. In Mugler v. Kan-
3. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 107
S. Ct. 2378, 2386 (1978) (citing United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)).
The First Lutheran case confirmed, if there ever was doubt, that the fifth amend-
ment's requirement of just compensation applies to so-called regulatory takings (i.e.
takings by excessive use regulations). See infra notes 25 & 62.
4. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80-81 (1872). Cf. Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1856).
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sas,5 the Supreme Court laid the basis for extensive judicial
review of the merits of legislative enactments:
There are, of necessity, limits beyond which the legisla-
ture cannot rightfully go .... [T]he courts must obey the
Constitution rather than the law-making department of
government, and must, upon their own responsibility, de-
termine whether, in any particular case, these limits have
been passed.'
A few years later, with particular reference to the "eco-
nomic" due process protection of property, the Supreme
Court summarized the substantive due process limits on the
legislature's general police power in Lawton v. Steele:7
To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in
behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the inter-
ests of the public ... require such interference; and, sec-
ond, that the means are reasonably necessary for the ac-
complishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.'
To implement this substantive due process standard as a lit-
eral "test" of constitutional validity would require an expan-
sive program of judicial review. It does not appear, however,
that the Court in Lawton v. Steele intended merely to make a
statement of political philosophy, but rather to establish a le-
5. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
6. Id. at 661 (emphasis added). In Mugler v. Kansas, the Court was concerned
with the limits of legislative authority under the so-called police power. The states'
police power is very broad, including "everything essential to the public safety, health
and morals" and authorizes the state to "interfere wherever the public interests de-
mand it." Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 (1894). The limits of the police power,
in other words, impose little substantive constraint.
The Mugler court upheld, as a legitimate exercise of the police power, a Kansas
statute that generally prohibited the production of beer, severely impairing the value
and usefulness of privately-owned brewery equipment. As discussed infra, text ac-
companying notes 17-19, the court also held that a regulation merely of the use of
property, such as that effected by the Kansas prohibition statute, could not be con-
sidered a taking or appropriation for public benefit.
7. 152 U.S. 133 (1894).
8. Id. at 137.
1987]
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gal test, subjecting legislative activities to the "supervision" of
the courts." During the next forty years, the Supreme Court
did provide substantive "economic" due process review in a
selection of cases challenging legislation that abridged the lib-
erties of private ownership (among other things). In the exer-
cise of this review, the challenged regulations were some-
times,10 but not always," struck down.
The Supreme Court's willingness to engage in such "eco-
nomic due process" review did not, however, last long. By
1938, the Court had made it clear that it would no longer im-
plement substantive due process in economic matters by judi-
cial review of legislatures' judgments. 12 The Court's power of
economic due process review was never quite forsaken, and its
post-1938 opinions have still occasionally quoted or referred
to the standard of Lawton v. Steele." The official policy is,
however, deference to the legislature, and "[t]he doctrine ...
that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitu-
tional when they believe the legislature has acted unwisely -
has long since been discarded."
III. Regulation of Property and the Just Compensation
Clause
In simplest terms, the just compensation requirement is a
commitment by government to respect the rights of private
owners much as the governed are expected to do. Although
9. Id. at 137. In deciding Lawton v. Steele, the court provided an extensive dis-
cussion of the balance between public necessity and private interests. Id. at 140-41.
The law in question provided for the confiscation of fishing equipment used in viola-
tion of the state's fish and game law. The court held that, on balance, the law was
justified and, therefore, constitutionally valid.
10. E.g. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Washington ex
rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
11. A notable exception was Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926), the seminal case upholding the state's power to impose zoning.
12. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("regulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced uncon-
stitutional unless . . . it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it
rests upon some rational basis").
13. E.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962).
14. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
[Vol. 4
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the government does have a privileged position in the acquisi-
tion of property -it can force an owner to sell - it must re-
spect private owners' rights at least to the extent of paying for
what it takes. At the same time, however, the just compensa-
tion clause could hardly mean that the government must pay
compensation every time the normal process of governing re-
sults in an impairment of private property interests.15 It
would practically defeat the government's central purpose, to
enact and implement laws for the public good, if it were re-
quired to "regulate by purchase.""6
Over the years, the Supreme Court has not found it easy
to arrive at a reliable verbal formulation to delineate between
those property impairments which are compensable "takings"
and those which are not. As early as Mugler v. Kansas,1 7 how-
ever, the major category of non-compensable property impair-
ments was fairly clearly defined. In the words of the Court:
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for pur-
poses that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injuri-
ous to the health, morals or safety of the community, can-
not, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an
appropriation of property for the public benefit. 8
Since Mugler, the major category of compensable property
impairments has turned out to be those which fall within the
residuum that Mugler left outside the non-compensable do-
main, viz. impairments other than "prohibitions simply upon
the use of property." Indeed, viewed in terms of the Mugler
distinction between use-impairments "simply" and other
property impairments, the Supreme Court's takings determi-
nations have shown a remarkable consistency.1 9
15. As Justice Holmes has written: "Government hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413
(1922).
16. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979) (emphasis in original).
17. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
18. Id. at 668-69 (emphasis added).
19. A review of the Supreme Court cases, demonstrating their adherence to the
distinction made in the text, and a detailed elaboration of the two different types of
19871
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In the pattern of holdings since Mugler, a distinction be-
tween two conceptually discrete kinds of property interest can
be observed; whether or not particular property impairments
are compensable "takings" has depended, as a factual matter,
on which kind of property interest was impaired. 0 Compensa-
tion has been consistently denied when the government's ac-
tion merely impairs the owner's interest in freely making use
of the property,21 "[a] prohibition simply upon the use. "22
When, however, the government impairs the interest in having
the property to oneself - the legal protection from interfer-
ence by others - compensation has consistently been re-
quired.23 In short, the total property ownership interest in-
property interests which underlie the distinction, is set forth in my earlier article, J.
Humbach, A Unifying Theory for the Just Compensation Cases: Takings, Regula-
tion and Public Use, 34 Rutgers L. Rev. 243 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Unifying
Theory].
20. In Unifying Theory, supra note 19, the two property interests critical to the
analysis, designated "rights" and "freedoms," were formally defined in order to pro-
vide a verbal formulation which would successfully differentiate between compensa-
ble "takings" and other, non-compensable impairments. The formal conceptual dis-
tinction which works to distinguish the cases is very similar to Hohfeld's conceptions
of "right" and "privilege." See W. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 35-50
(Cook ed. 1964) (also found at 23 Yale L.J. 16, 28-44 (1913)); see also Unifying The-
ory, supra note 19, at 253 n.49.
As formally defined, the "right/freedom dichotomy" appears to have an explana-
tory power which extends to virtually all Supreme Court takings cases. The only no-
table exceptions are a handful of decisions that involve abridgements of private rights
for the direct benefit of other private persons, as occurs, for example, when property
law reforms incidentally reallocate existing rights among private owners, rather than
take "for public use." Unifying Theory, supra note 19, at 281-87. See also Humbach,
Constitutional Limits on the Power to Take Private Property: Public Purpose and
Public Use, 66 Or. L. Rev. - (1988). which reviews the extent to which the govern-
ment may reassign property rights from one private person to another as occurs, for
example, in law reform.
The formal definitions appear in the footnotes which follow.
21. In Unifying Theory, supra note 19, this non-compensable interest was re-
ferred to as a "freedom." The formal definition of a property "freedom" which serves
to divide the cases is: "[Tlhe legal advantage which one has when, in reference to
particular behavior, others cannot by legal action invoke the physical or moral power
of the government in order to redress or induce the behavior on one's own part."
Unifying Theory, supra note 19, at 257.
22. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668 (1887).
23. In Unifying Theory, this compensable interest was referred to as a property
"right," echoing the usage of Hohfeld who, among others, recognized the distinction
between rights and freedoms. Unifying Theory, supra note 19, at 253 n.49. The for-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss2/1
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cludes both "freedoms" to use and property "rights" to have
others' forbearance, each representing a distinct kind of prop-
erty interest.2 ' The post-Mugler cases on takings divide neatly
according to which type of property interest, freedoms or
rights, is affected. The just compensation requirement applies
if, but only if, property "rights" (as opposed to merely "free-
doms") are impaired.2"
IV. The Tests for "Takings" Determinations after 1978
Although the Supreme Court's takings decisions have
consistently followed the distinction adumbrated in Mugler,
between mere freedom impairments and governmental acts
which take rights, they have followed the distinction tacitly.
No case to date has given explicit recognition to the rights/
freedoms dichotomy or to its de facto significance in takings
jurisprudence. On the contrary, the Court has insisted repeat-
edly that it has no "set formula" for deciding which govern-
mental actions constitute takings requiring compensation and
mal definition of a property "right" which serves to divide the cases is: "[Tihe legal
advantage of having the physical or moral power of the government invocable by legal
action in order to induce the compliance of others or to redress others' non-compli-
ance with some particular set of behavioral requirements." Unifying Theory, supra
note 19, at 254.
24. See Unifying Theory, supra note 19, at 258-61.
25. A discussion of the right/freedom dichotomy would be incomplete without
reference to the possibility that a freedom deprivation might go "too far" and thus
become the functional equivalent of a "rights" deprivation, with the attendant re-
quirement of just compensation. The landmark case is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), in which the Court wrote: "To make it commercially
impractical to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional
purposes as appropriating or destroying it." Id. at 414. In other words, a deprivation
of the freedom to use property can be so extensive as to make the right of exclusivity
a mere hollow shell, an empty hoax, with the result that - for all practical purposes
- the right to exclude no longer exists.
The Supreme Court has apparently never actually held a mere use-regulation
("freedom" deprivation) to be a compensable taking, not even in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232,
1241 (1987) (describing the applicable portion of Pennsylvania Coal as an "advisory
opinion").
A use-regulation might also be the functional equivalent of a taking of property
"rights" in other ways, for example if it is part of an "out-and-out plan of extortion"
and private property is acquired by the government as a result. Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3148 (1987).
7
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which do not.16
Even while the Supreme Court has denied having any set
formula to decide takings cases, however, two formulations
have appeared repeatedly in its takings opinions of the past
ten years. One of these formulations is a "firmly establish-
ed, . . . regularly and recently reaffirmed" three-factor
"framework:" 27
To aid in this determination [whether a governmental
regulation of property constitutes a "taking"], however,
we have identified three factors which have 'particular
significance:' (1) 'the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant;' (2)'the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions;' and (3) 'the character of the governmental
action.' 28
The other frequently recited formulation combines two alter-
native factors "that ... have become integral parts of our tak-
ings analysis": 29
"[Liand use regulation can effect a taking if it 'does not
substantially advance legitimate state interests .... or de-
nies an owner economically viable use of his land.' "30
Both the three-factor framework and the two-alternatives
formulation appear to have been originally composed, from
antecedent elements, in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City.31 The Penn Central case held that New York City
26. E.g., Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008, 3020 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); and Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
27. Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2082 (1987) (quoting Kaiser v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)).
28. Bowen, 107 S. Ct. at 3020 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)).
29. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1242
(1987).
30. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
31. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). The usually quoted version of the two-alternatives for-
mulation is from Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), but the substance of the
[Vol. 4
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could prohibit high-rise construction in the airspace above
Grand Central Terminal, significantly diminishing the overall
economic potential of the property, without paying "just com-
pensation" to the Terminal's owners. However, before ad-
dressing itself to the private owners' specific contentions in
Penn Central, the Court provided a general "review [of] the
factors that have shaped the jurisprudence of the Fifth
Amendment" just compensation clause.32 The now familiar
three-factor framework and two-alternatives formulation were
presented and, to an extent, defined in the course of that
review.33
Although the three-factor framework and the two-alter-
natives formulation do not appear to be exactly congruent,
and they are only rarely employed in the same case, 4 the
Penn Central Court seemingly did not regard them as belong-
ing to distinct or alternate modes of "takings" analysis. On
the contrary, its reference to the considerations underlying
the two-alternatives formulation was interwoven into its dis-
cussion of the "economic impact" and "investment-backed ex-
pectations" factors of the three-factor framework.3 5 To illus-
two alternatives themselves, articulated as alternative tests of taking, first appeared
in Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 & 137.
32. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123.
33. Id. at 123-29.
34. But cf. id. at 124, 127. See also Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n. v.
DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1242-48 (1987) (quoting both, but analyzing at length
only in terms of the two-alternatives formulation).
The pattern over the past ten years has generally been to expound at length on
each branch of either the three-factor framework or the two-alternatives formulation,
and then to reach a conclusion.
Using the two-alternatives formulation: Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1242 (1987);
Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (1980). See also United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459
U.S. 70, 74-77 (1982).
Using the three-factor framework: Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008, (1987);
Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475
U.S. 211 (1986).
35. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127. Although the Court's analysis of the specific
facts in Penn Central was, if anything, in terms of the three-factor framework, its
conclusion was in terms of the alternatives comprising the two-alternatives formula-
tion: "The restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the gen-
eral welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but
also afford appellants opportunities further to enhance not only the Terminal site
proper but also other properties." Id. at 138.
9
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trate the conceptual connection between the three-factor
framework and the two-alternatives formulation, it will be
helpful to summarize briefly the Court's original presentation
of these two new "set formulas" for takings analysis.
The Court began with an explanation of the "investment-
backed expectations" factor of the three-factor framework. It
observed that, "in a wide variety of contexts ... government
may execute laws or programs that adversely affect recognized
economic values." 36 To entitle an owner to compensation,
however, the economic harm caused by government must "in-
terfere with interests that [are] sufficiently bound up with the
reasonable expectations of the claimant." 37 As a prime exam-
ple of economic interests not protected by the just compensa-
tion clause, the Court cited the advantages enjoyed by ripa-
rian owners on navigable streams. Such riparian owners
traditionally hold subject to the so-called navigation servi-
tude, viz., the federal government's power to preserve and en-
hance navigability; federal impingements on private riparian
advantages are therefore not compensable.3 8 In like fashion,
according to Penn Central, an owner's hope to be able to use
his or her property for any particular purpose is subject to the
government's power to impose prohibitions designed to pro-
mote health, safety, morals or general welfare.39 It would not
be reasonable for an owner to "expect" otherwise.40 There is
36. Id. at 124.
37. Id. at 125 (emphasis added). An open issue about this factor is the impor-
tance to be placed on the notion that, to be protected, expectations must be not
merely reasonable but also "investment-backed." The Court has not explained why
the government should be freer to expropriate adventitious advantages, such as mar-
ket appreciation or inheritance.
38. Id. at 124-25. Because it has long been established that riparian lands are
held subject to the navigation servitude, expectations of immunity from exercises of
the navigation power could not be "reasonable" expectations. See United States v.
Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502 (1945) ("only those economic advantages
are 'rights' which have the law [in] back of them"); and United States v. Chandler-
Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913). The Court also mentioned, less under-
standably, the vulnerability of a vested remainderman to diminution of his or her
interest for the benefit of a life tenant. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125 (citing
Demorest v. City Bank Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944)).
39. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-27.
40. It could not, of course, be literally true that property in general is subject to
[Vol. 4
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accordingly no ground for finding a "taking," or requiring
compensation, when such police-power prohibitions are
enacted.
Having affirmed the police power to restrict property use,
however, the Court immediately added that "a use restriction
on real property may constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably
necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose
...or perhaps if it has an unduly harsh impact upon the
owner's use of the property." '41 It was in this statement, at the
close of the discussion of the "expectations" factor, that the
Court provided its first explicit articulation of the two tests
comprising the two-alternatives formulation.42 It was here too,
in its reference to necessity for a public purpose, that the
Court first described a takings clause test which invoked con-
siderations substantially identical to the standards applicable
in traditional economic due process.4"
the police power in the same way that riparian land is subject to the navigation
power, for that would mean that there is no just compensation requirement at all. In
subsequent cases, the Court has somewhat clarified things by distinguishing the case
of property held in circumstances historically affected by extensive regulation. See,
e.g., Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986); and Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
41. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (emphasis added).
42. Note, however, that the exact wording in Penn Central differs from that usu-
ally quoted by the Court, viz. the verbalization in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980). For the Agins wording, see supra text accompanying note 30.
43. As authority for this new public-purpose test in takings analysis, the Court
cited Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). However, Nectow was a case
in which a zoning ordinance was struck down on the basis of economic due process
analysis without any mention whatever of the just compensation mandate or any al-
leged "taking."
The Court also stated that its two-alternatives formulation was "implicit" in
Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). However, Goldblatt was like-
wise argued and decided on an economic due process theory. The plaintiffs had al-
leged that the zoning ordinance upheld in Goldblatt "prevents them from continuing
their business and therefore takes their property without due process of law." Id. at
591. The Court's analysis in Goldblatt was predicated on the economic due process
landmark, Lawton v. Steele, discussed supra text accompanying notes 7-9. The only
mention in Goldblatt of "takings" concerns as such was a reference to the fact that a
regulation can be so onerous that just compensation is required. Goldblatt, 369 U.S.
at 594. Finding that there was no evidence that the statute in Goldblatt was so oner-
ous, the Court turned to the dispositive issue, writing: "The question, therefore, nar-
rows to whether the prohibition ... is a valid exercise of the town's police power." Id.
Also cited as support for the two-alternatives formulation in Penn Central was a
11
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After stating the two tests which now comprise the two-
alternatives formulation, the Court returned to its presenta-
tion of the three-factor framework, directing its attention next
to the "economic impact" factor - apparently in order to
elaborate on the concept of "unduly harsh impact" to which it
had just referred. Even though a statute substantially furthers
important public policies, it wrote: [The statute] "may so
frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to
amount to a 'taking.' ",44 Nevertheless, the Court seemed to re-
gard only the severest of economic impacts to be indicative of
"taking." It used words such as "complete destruction, ' '45
"wholly useless,"" and "nearly the same effect as the com-
plete destruction of [the owner's] right"' 7 in describing the
precedents. The decisions, it wrote, "uniformly reject the pro-
position that diminution in property value, standing alone,
can establish a 'taking'."' 8 In short, the Court left little reason
to believe that the "economic impact" factor was anything
different from the second prong of the two-alternatives formu-
lation, viz. that a taking occurs if the government "denies an
owner economically viable use" of his property.49
concurring opinion by Justice Stevens, written a year earlier, which stated that Jus-
tice Sutherland had "fused" the two restrictions on governmental infringements of
property - due process and just compensation - into a single standard in the 1926
zoning landmark, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513-14
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). It is hard to find anything in the Euclid opinion,
however, to support Justice Stevens' notion that Justice Sutherland had the just com-
pensation requirement or any sort of "fusion" in mind.
44. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922) as the "leading case").
45. Id. at 128 (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960)
("[g]overnment's complete destruction of a materialman's lien in certain property
held a 'taking' ")).
46. Id. (citing Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908)
("if height restriction makes property wholly useless 'the rights of property ... pre-
vail over the other public interest' ")).
47. Id. at 127 (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922)
(striking down an anti-subsidence statute which "made it commercially impractical to
mine" certain coal)).
48. Id. at 131 (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(seventy-five percent diminution in value caused by zoning prohibitions); and
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (87.5 % diminution in value)).
49. See supra text accompanying note 30, where the two-alternatives formula-
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Thus, in the Supreme Court's general review of "takings"
jurisprudence in Penn Central, the Court connected both
prongs of the two-alternatives formulation with factors of the
three-factor framework. The "advancing state interests"
prong of the former corresponds to the "expectations" factor
of the latter; an owner cannot reasonably "expect" constitu-
tional protection from legislation which is necessary to effec-
tuate substantial public purposes. Similarly, the "denies eco-
nomically use" prong of the two alternatives corresponds to
the "economic impact" factor of the three-factor framework.
Only the "character of the governmental action" factor,
discussed by the Court last in Penn Central, remained uncon-
nected with any considerations underlying the two-alterna-
tives formulation. For the Court in Penn Central, the "char-
acter" factor in the three-factor framework seemed to refer
either to elements of physical invasion 51 or to the fact, if ap-
plicable, that the government acted to acquire resources for
"uniquely public functions." 51 However, the inherent flexibil-
ity of the "character" factor was demonstrated during the
1986 Term when the Court found a governmental action to be
a taking because its character was "extraordinary," viz. it ef-
fected a greater deprivation of important ownership incidents
than was necessary to achieve the public objective to be
served.2 Like the "advancing state interests" prong of the
two-alternatives formulation, the "character" factor was thus
employed to invoke considerations which are substantially
identical to the standards applicable in traditional economic
due process analysis.
tion is set forth.
50. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
51. Id. at 128; see also Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.,(1986); Webb's
Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
52. Hodel v. Irving, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2083-84, (abrogation of power to pass on
certain property by descent or devise). But cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979)
(abrogation of freedom to sell, purchase, barter, transport, import, or export held not
to be a taking).
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V. The "Advancing State Interests" Test and Economic
Due Process
As a test of "taking," the "advancing state interests"
prong of the two-alternatives formulation53 is a bit peculiar.
The requirement that governmental acts serve legitimate state
interests is not unique - or even indigenous - to takings ju-
risprudence. Rather, it is the traditional core of substantive
due process that all governmental actions must serve a legiti-
mate state interest to be within the scope of the government's
regulatory authority at all.5 4 Not until Penn Central was this
substantive due process test borrowed as a component of tak-
ings analysis for purposes of the just compensation
requirement.55
The "advancing state interests" test is, moreover, some-
what maladapted to its new role as a test of "takings." More
often than not it will fail to provide a suitable basis for distin-
guishing compensable property impairments from the non-
compensable impairments which the government may consti-
tutionally impose. For example, the acquisition of land to con-
struct a public school certainly advances a legitimate state in-
terest, but it would just as certainly violate the just
compensation clause for the government to attempt such an
acquisition without payment.5 On the other hand, the acqui-
sition of land to build a facility for purely private benefit
would not be constitutionally permissible even if compensa-
tion were paid. 7 In short, the existence of a legitimate state
interest in acquiring property is not a substitute for just com-
pensation any more than its absence can be remedied by the
fact that just compensation is paid.
53. See supra text accompanying note 30, where the two-alternatives formula-
tion is set forth.
54. See supra text accompanying notes 4-14.
55. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
56. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
57. "[Olne person's property may not be taken for the benefit of another private
person without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid." Ha-
waii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (quoting Thompson v. Consol.
Gas Util. Corp. 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)). See also Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska,
164 U.S. 403 (1896).
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If the "advancing state interests" test for takings analysis
has an operational domain at all, that domain must lie in a
middle ground between the extremes described in the preced-
ing paragraph. A classic case occupying this middle ground is
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,58 which involved the valid-
ity of a state statute that prohibited the mining of certain
coal. The purpose of the prohibition was to prevent subsi-
dence of the land surface as a result of undermining, but its
effect was to render the affected coal essentially worthless. In
a now famous opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court declared
the anti-subsidence statute to be invalid on the grounds that
"the statute does not disclose a public interest sufficient to
warrant so extensive a destruction of the defendant's consti-
tutionally protected rights."59 The public interest being served
was balanced against the private imposition that resulted.
Although Justice Holmes' opinion rested on what was, in
effect, an "advancing state interests" rationale, the holding in
Mahon was not based on the Constitution's just compensation
requirement for "takings." Indeed, Holmes' rationale for inva-
lidity is practically a paraphrase of the classic economic due
process standard announced in Lawton v. Steele.6 0 The
Mahon case was, after all, decided during the heyday of eco-
nomic due process judicial review. The only references in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon to the just compensation re-
quirement for "takings" came in the course of a speculative
discussion, 61 going beyond the facts at issue, which the Su-
preme Court has subsequently described as an "advisory opin-
ion."6 2 Thus, despite the fact that the Mahon case has become
58. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
59. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
60. See supra text accompanying note 8, where the Lawton due process standard
is set forth.
61. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415-16.
62. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. at 1232, 1241
(1987). The "advisory opinion" portion of the Mahon opinion is by far the more fa-
mous portion, in which Holmes wrote that a regulation of property use would be
treated as a compensable taking if it goes "too far." Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at
415.
In Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 197-200 (1985), the Court reviewed, without deciding, arguments that the "advi-
1987]
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widely regarded as the seminal case on so-called "regulatory
takings," it actually provides only obiter dictum on that point.
Its holding was one of economic due process.
The days of probing economic due process review are now
officially in the past. Yet, cases may still arise in which the
Court finds it judicious to decide, as it did in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon, that a private imposition cannot be ra-
tionally justified by a putative public interest. To provide a
constitutional basis for such judicial review the Court could
explicitly return to its pre-1938 willingness to accord eco-
nomic due process review of legislative decisions. It has not.
In the alternative, the Court could enlist the "advancing state
interests" test of the two-alternatives formulation as a basis
for reviewing the rationality of legislation. Or, using the three-
factor framework, it could support a more probing judicial re-
view of statutes by treating the "character of the governmen-
tal action" factor as bearing on the statute's rationality. Dur-
ing the 1986 Term, the Supreme Court rendered decisions
employing each of the latter two approaches, in the cases de-
scribed below.
VI. Cases Using the "Three-Factor Framework"
The Supreme Court used the analysis of the three-factor
framework as the basis for decision in two of the takings cases
decided during the 1986 Term, Hodel v. Irvings3 and Bowen v.
Gilliard.6" The Court concluded that there was an unconstitu-
tional taking in Irving, but not in Gilliard. In terms of the
three-factor framework, the principal distinction between the
two cases appeared to lie in the different "character" of the
governmental actions at issue. The underlying considerations
which really made the difference, however, were traditional
sory" portion of Pennsylvania Coal was also actually based on due process rather
than just compensation considerations. The Court since has implicitly rejected such
arguments by holding definitively that use restrictions which go "too far" require just
compensation. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987). The due-process basis for the holding of Pennsylvania Coal
has not, however, been questioned.
63. 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
64. 107 S. Ct. 3008 (1987).
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considerations of substantive due process.
A. Bowen v. Gilliard
The question in Bowen v. Gilliard was whether the tak-
ings prohibition is violated by a law that requires parents to
assign their children's support payments to the state as a con-
dition to the family's eligibility for benefits under the Aid for
Dependent Children program (AFDC).6 Although the first
fifty dollars of support collected by the state was to be remit-
ted to the family,6 6 the child's separate interest in his or her
support payments was destroyed, and "the practical effect was
that many families' total income was reduced." '67 According to
the Court, Congress' goal was to reduce federal expenditures,
and the statute "unquestionably" served that goal. In its first
three years it was designed to divert nearly one-half billion
dollars from needy families to the Federal Treasury.68 Observ-
ing that, among other things, the AFDC program is "entirely
voluntary,"69 the Court concluded that the required assign-
ment of a child's support payments by a parent to the state
"is not a taking of the child's property without just
compensation. '7 0
Because support monies "belong to the children" with the
custodial parent as a "mere trustee for them," the District
Court had reasoned that the "forced assignment" by the par-
ent to the state in exchange for AFDC benefits was a taking of
the child's private property.71 Abstractly, the facts of Gilliard
are not far removed from those of Webb's Fabulous Pharma-
cies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 2 in which the Court struck down a
Florida law that appropriated the interest accruing on monies
65. Id. at 3018-19.
66. Id. at 3013.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 3016. The requirement was added to the AFDC program by the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. §§ 1-1082 (Supp. III 1985)). Bowen, 107 S. Ct. at 3011.
69. Bowen, 107 S. Ct. at 3019, 3021.
70. Id. at 3021.
71. Id. at 3014, 3014 n.10.
72. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
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which litigants were compelled to deposit with the clerks of
courts. There was the distinction in Webb's that resort to the
courts, unlike AFDC, is not always "entirely voluntary. ' '73
Given economic realities, however, resort to AFDC may like-
wise not be quite as voluntary as the Supreme Court assumed.
At any rate, the upshot of the new AFDC assignment rules
was that, through the combined action of a child's custodial
parent and the state, the child's separate interest in payments
for his or her support was annihilated.74 Reviewing the Bowen
v. Gilliard facts in terms of the three-factor framework, how-
ever, the Court concluded that no taking was involved.
1. Economic Impact in Bowen
Although the AFDC assignment requirement formally
meant that support monies paid for the benefit of a given
child would be diverted from their intended object, the Court
felt that "this argument places form over substance, and la-
bels over reality. 7 5 The "reality," according to the Court, is
that "the typical AFDC parent will have used the support
money as part of the general family fund even without its be-
ing transferred. ''1 6 In other words, the economic impact of the
assignment on the child is not significant because, to be blunt,
custodial parents typically convert such funds from their in-
tended use anyway.
The Court further observed that the economic impact of
appropriating the child's support payments was "mitigated"
by the fact that fifty dollars of the support payments received
is remitted to the family, and the state does the collection.
Thus, "whatever the diminution of the value of the child's
right to have the support funds used for his or her 'exclusive'
benefit may be, it is not so substantial to constitute a tak-
ing."' "7 One might be startled by the Court's frank acknowl-
73. E.g., for defendants, resort to the courts is not voluntary.
74. Except to the extent that the child might share in the first fifty dollars of the
support payments paid on his or her behalf. See supra text accompanying note 66.
75. Bowen, 107 S. Ct. at 3019.
76. Id. at 3020.
77. Id.
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edgement that the rationale for assessing support from non-
custodial parents is a charade, but it does seem to follow that
the economic impact of the support assignments is generally
slight.
2. Investment-Backed Expectations
Based primarily on the fact that child-support decrees
may be modified, the Court decided that children receiving
support payments hold no "vested protectable expectation"
that the support will continue in any particular amount.7 8 The
Court's reasoning is, however, a bit tricky, slipping between
two distinct concepts, viz. the child's right to support in gen-
eral and his or her right to particular amounts of support.
The fact that support decrees are modifiable may logically
preclude a child from having firm expectations as to any par-
ticular amounts of support. In the current socio-legal setting,
however, the right to support, itself, is as firm an expectation
- and as practically "vested" - as any can be.
The AFDC scheme does not merely reduce the amount of
support which might be available for the child, it commutes
the child's personal support payment to an AFDC payment
for family use. The Court does not explain how the
modifiability of support decrees entails the conclusion that a
child's "expectations concerning the future use of support
payments" are not the sort of expectation protected under
the just compensation clause. 79 The Court would have been on
more solid ground here if it again averted to the "reality" that
custodial parents routinely convert the child's support pay-
ments to family use anyway.8
3. Character of the Governmental Action
In concluding that the character of the governmental ac-
tion "militates against" a finding of an unconstitutional tak-
78. Id.
79. Id. at 3021 (emphasis added). The expectations, however firm, are not of
course "investment-backed." But if this was the reason for denying them protection,
the Court did not say so.
80. Cf. supra text accompanying note 76.
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ing, the Court's opinion describes the governmental action as
merely a "decision" and a "hard choice" on the allocation of
public benefits.81 It failed, however, to deal with the crux of
the takings issue,82 viz. that children's rights to support are
actually assigned to the state.8 3 In overlooking the fact of as-
signment when it analyzed the character of the governmental
action, the Court seemed at first to have forgotten its commit-
ment to "reality" that it stressed elsewhere in its opinion. 4
Implicitly, however, the reality does appear to control. As the
Court previously cautioned, form should not be placed before
substance and, in this context, to focus attention on the as-
signment would do exactly that. Assuming, as the Court does,
that custodial parents generally use their children's support
for family purposes anyway, the parent's decision to divert the
support to the government, in order to obtain AFDC benefits
for the family, really introduces no new deprivation of prop-
erty. Accordingly, the government's act of receiving the diver-
sions would not have the "character" of a taking.
B. Hodel v. Irving
The challenged statute in Hodel v. Irving 5 was designed
to address the problem that parcels of land alloted to individ-
ual Indians in the late nineteenth century had, over the years,
become splintered into multiple undivided interests, with
some parcels having dozens or even hundreds of owners.88 The
administrative costs associated with such highly fractionalized
81. Bowen, 107 S. Ct. at 3021.
82. The Court identified the crux of the takings issue, writing that: "The only
possible legal basis for appellees' takings claim, therefore, is the requirement that an
applicant for AFDC benefits must assign support payments to the State .... " Id. at
3019.
83. The Court also suggests that the state is merely responding to the custodial
parent's decision to apply for AFDC, a decision which "the law does not require." Id.
at 3021. The parent's volition is at best, however, a very vulnerable volition, which
economic stresses make easy prey to governmental extractions of their children's
rights.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
85. 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987).
86. Id. at 2079.
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parcels became disproportionate. a7 To gradually alleviate the
problem, Congress enacted the Indian Land Consolidation
Act"8 which provided, in part, for an "escheat" to the tribe of
any fractional interest of a decedent representing less than
two percent of the total or earning less than one hundred dol-
lars in the previous year.8 9 In other words, the statute abol-
ished transfer by descent or devise of the smallest fractional
shares9 0 The question was whether this so called "escheat"
provision, by abolishing descent and devise, effected a taking
without just compensation. 1
On the basis of Andrus v. Allard,92 decided in 1979, it
would be hard to predict that the Court would reach the con-
clusion it did in Hodel v. Irving, namely that the "escheat"
provision effectuated a taking. In Andrus, the Court had
unanimously decided that no taking results when the govern-
ment imposes a total ban on selling or otherwise trading in
certain kinds of property. 3 As in Andrus, the governmental
action in Hodel caused no physical invasion of private prop-
erty, nor an interference with its possession or use. Although
the legislation challenged in Hodel deprived the private own-
ers of the freedom to transfer certain property by will or have
it pass by intestacy, the owners remained able, by resort to
alternate means, to control the disposition of the affected
property following their deaths, for example, by use of a revo-
cable inter vivos trust.9 4 The owner's ability to make inter
87. For one forty acre parcel mentioned by the Court, the estimated administra-
tive cost per year was $17,580 for a piece of land worth about $8000. Id. at 2081.
88. Pub. L. No. 97-459, 96 Stat. 2515, 2517 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
2201-10 (1982)).
89. Hodel, 107 S. Ct. at 2079.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2078.
92. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
93. The statutes at issue prohibited the sale, purchase, export, import, barter or
trade of eagle feathers. The statutes did not, however, prohibit the "possession or
transport" of eagle feathers. Emphasizing the absence of any physical invasion or
surrender of the artifact, and that the owners retained the right to possess, transport,
donate or devise their property, the Court held in Andrus that the prohibitions on
other disposition did not constitute a compensable taking. Id. at 65-68.
94. Hodel, 107 S. Ct. at 2083. The Court was not impressed with the alternatives:
"The fact that it may be possible for the owners of these interests to effectively con-
1987]
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vivos transfers, by sale or otherwise, was not affected.
It is doubtful that, for the property at issue in Hodel, the
elimination of testate and intestate succession per se had any
significant effect whatever on either the value of the property
or its use.9 5 Nevertheless, after reviewing the facts of Hodel v.
Irving in terms of the three-factor framework, the Court con-
cluded that the "abolition of both descent and devise of a par-
ticular class of property may be a taking.1
9 6
1. Economic Impact
The Court97 asserted that there was "no question" that
the escheat provision could have a "substantial" relative eco-
nomic impact on the owners; the parties in the case owned
fractional interests ranging between $100 and $2,700 in
value.98 As the Court said, "[t]hese are not trivial sums."99 It
trol disposition upon death through complex inter vivos transactions such as revoca-
ble trusts, is simply not an adequate substitute for the rights taken given the nature
of the property." Id. The Court did not explain, however, what it was about the "na-
ture" of this property that made some forms of intergenerational transmission so
highly preferable to other forms as to be practically invulnerable to legislative change.
95. The Court stated that "there is no question . . . that the right to pass on
valuable property to one's heirs is itself a valuable right. Id. at 2082. The Court did
not, however, state how valuable that right would be. The Court cited to a table in
the Code of Federal Regulations, 26 C.F.R. § 20.2031-7(f) Table A (1987), showing
values of remainder interests, apparently as "evidence" of the value magnitudes
which it thought to be involved in Hodel. This choice of authorities was, however,
seemingly not apt. The value of a remainderman's interest represents the value of the
right to receive future possession and use of the property, not the value of the right
to transmit such possession and use. It is far from self-evident that the value of the
right to transmit property at death is equal to the value of the right to receive such
property upon the death of another.
96. Hodel, 107 S. Ct. at 2084.
97. Use of the expression "the Court" in reference to the "opinion of the Court"
is somewhat questionable in Hodel v. Irving. Although the case was decided without a
dissenting opinion, only one of the justices, the opinion's author (O'Connor, J.), was
in unqualified agreement with the "opinion of the Court." Nevertheless, six other
justices, in two concurring opinions, appeared to join in all portions of the "opinion of
the Court" referenced in the discussion that follows. Their primary disagreement con-
cerned the effect of the holding in Hodel on the earlier case of Andrus v. Allard, 444
U.S. 51 (1979) (prohibition on all inter vivos dispositions of eagle feathers held not a
taking). The opinion of the Court itself gave Andrus v. Allard only a "But cf." Hodel,
107 S. Ct. at 2084.
98. Hodel, 107 S. Ct. at 2082. It should, however, be noted that the holding in
Hodel v. Irving was apparently broad enough to protect interests having values as
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol4/iss2/1
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must be remembered, however, that these sums do not re-
present the actual magnitude of economic impact on the own-
ers, who retained full beneficial use of the property as well as
the power to control disposition of the property.100 The "eco-
nomic impact" was only the loss, if any, which resulted from
the statutory abolition of two of the several available methods
for controlling property devolution after death.' 1 The meth-
ods still available, such as the creation of a revocable inter
vivos trust, are not intrinsically any more complex than mak-
ing a will, leaving the question: Was there any economic im-
pact at all in Hodel v. Irving?10 2
2. Investment-Backed Expectations
The Court conceded that "[tihe extent to which any of
the [fractional share owners] has 'investment-backed expecta-
tions' in passing on the property is dubious."'" 3 None of the
parties in the case could point to any such expectations, apart
from the fact that their ancestors had "ceded" large parts of
the Great Sioux Reservation in exchange for the alloted lands
now at issue.'04 Given this absence of any real "investment"
by the current private owners, the Court was presented with
little as $.000418, producing an income of one cent every 177 years. Id. at 2081.
99. Id. at 2082.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.
101. As previously noted, see supra note 95, the Court appears to have errone-
ously equated the value of the right to receive possession in the future with the value
of the power to convey future possession, thereby probably overvaluing the economic
impact of the escheat provision. Even accepting the Court's equation of the two val-
ues, however, the economic impact that results from a partial abridgement of the
power to convey future possession is greatly attenuated if effective mechanisms for
achieving the same ends remain available.
102. Creating a revocable inter vivos trust is, to be sure, more complex than sim-
ply letting one's property descend to the heirs selected by the law pursuant to intes-
tate succession. In that respect, however, the escheat provision in Hodel v. Irving can
be seen as a provision which simply substitutes one group of heirs (the tribe) for
another (members of the immediate family). The Court apparently agrees that the
government could lawfully have abolished "the descent of such interests by rules of
intestacy, thereby forcing the owners to formally designate an heir to prevent escheat
to the Tribe." Hodel, 107 S. Ct. at 2084.
103. Id. at 2083.
104. Id.
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an ideal opportunity to explain why expectations, if they are
reasonable, should also have to be "investment-backed" in or-
der to achieve full protection under the just compensation
clause. The Court did not, however, offer any explanation.
3. Character of the Governmental Action
Although the economic impact of the escheat provision on
investment-backed expectations was probably not enough to
indicate a taking, 0 5 the "character" of the escheat provision
was "extraordinary"' 16 - extraordinary enough to tip the bal-
ance. The Court described the escheat statute as "virtually an
abrogation of the right to pass on a certain type of property..
. to one's heirs.'10 7 Although that description was an exaggera-
tion,108 it is hard to argue that the abrogation was "extraordi-
nary," even if it was limited to descent and devise.
There was another extraordinary aspect to the escheat
provision, mentioned by the Court at least three times. 0 9 The
abolition of descent and devise in Hodel v. Irving applied
''even in circumstances when the governmental purpose
sought to be advanced, consolidation of ownership of Indian
lands, does not conflict with the further descent of the prop-
erty." 0 The "extraordinary step" of abolishing both descent
and devise even when such transfers might result in owner-
ship consolidation, thereby promoting the statutory purpose,
"goes too far.""' In short, the deciding element in Hodel v.
Irving was that the escheat law's adverse effect on individuals
was not merely substantial but it went well beyond merely ad-
dressing the public purpose which it was supposed to address.
105. Based solely on its analysis of the "economic impact" and "expectations"
factors, wrote the Court "we might well find section 207 [the challenged legislation]
constitutional." Id. at 2083.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. As noted earlier, other methods for passing on the property to the owner's
heirs or designees did remain available. See supra note 94.
109. Hodel, 107 S. Ct. at 2083-84.
110. Id. at 2084.
111. Id. (quoting Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 415 (1922)).
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In the traditional economic due process style, the Court
weighed whether the challenged legislation was a rational
means, not unduly oppressive on individuals, for accomplish-
ing the legislative objective. 1 '
C. Reconciling Hodel v. Irving and Bowen v. Gilliard
In both Hodel v. Irving and Bowen v. Gilliard the abso-
lute economic values or impacts involved were small, and the
investment-backed expectations were considered dubious or
non-existent. The main operative difference between the two
cases appears to lie in the Court's analysis of the "character"
of the governmental action.
In the language of the Court, the character of the govern-
mental action was considered "extraordinary" in Hodel while
merely a necessary "hard choice" concerning the allocation of
public benefits in Bowen. The "extraordinary" thing about
the Hodel escheat provision was that it was a heavy imposi-
tion on property ownership"' plus it effected that imposition
on owners even in circumstances where it would not further
the supposed public purpose. Penetrating words to reach the
substance, the vice of the Hodel escheat provision was that it
violated the traditional Lawton v. Steele standard of eco-
nomic due process. 1' In Bowen, the Court did not even con-
sider, in its takings clause discussion, the possibility that the
"character" of a governmental action requiring child support
payments to be assigned to the state might violate a standard
such as that announced in Lawton v. Steele. To the contrary,
the opinion expressly disavowed any intent to review "the rel-
evant social and economic objectives" or to decide whether "a
112. Cf. quotation from Lawton v. Steele, stating the standard of substantive due
process, quoted supra text accompanying note 8.
113. The Court stressed that the escheat destroyed both devise and descent, and
it appeared to regard the power to pass on property by devise and descent as "simi-
larly" important with the right to exclude others, described as "one of the most im-
portant sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."
Hodel, 107 S. Ct. at 2083 (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176
(1979)).
114. See supra text accompanying notes 4-14.
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more just and humane system" could be devised. " 5 In Bowen,
however, a substantive due process challenge was presented
explicitly and was decided separately from the "takings" is-
sue. In rejecting the due process challenge, the Court con-
cluded that it was "rational" for Congress to adjust the AFDC
program to reflect the fact that individual child support gen-
erally benefits entire family units. " Under the prevailing
standards of economic due process review, that was sufficient
to sustain the legislation.11 7
To summarize, the Bowen Court held, in the context of a
due process challenge, that the legislation in question was "ra-
tional" and that there was no independent "takings" ground
for declaring it constitutionally infirm. The challenged statute
in Hodel, by contrast, went too far, beyond what was reasona-
bly necessary to serve its public purpose, and it was therefore
struck down. It is clear that, at least in Hodel, the Court un-
dertook an active judicial review of the escheat statute's suita-
bility as a measure to promote its intended purpose. In both
cases, by actually expressing a holding on the issue of ration-
ality, the Court did more than would be required under the
extreme expressions of judicial deference found in some its
post-1938 opinions." 8
VII. Cases Using the Two-Alternatives Formulation
During the 1986 Term, the Supreme Court used the anal-
ysis of the two-alternatives formulation in two cases, Key-
stone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis" 9 and Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n."2 ° The governmental action was
upheld in Keystone Bituminous but not in Nollan. In both
cases the economic impacts were small in relation to the en-
115. Bowen v. Gilliard, 107 S. Ct. 3008, 3021 (1987) (quoting Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970)). "The Constitution does not empower this Court to
second-guess ... officials charged with the difficult responsibility of allocating limited
public welfare funds among the myriad of potential recipients." Id.
116. Id. at 3016-17.
117. Id. at 3015.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 4-14.
119. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
120. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
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tirety of the property interests affected. The difference lay in
the Court's application of the "advancing state interests"
prong of the two-alternatives formulation.
A. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis
Roughly sixty-five years after invalidating a Pennsylvania
anti-subsidence statute in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,'2,
the Court was faced with a new challenge to a new anti-subsi-
dence program 12 2 in Keystone. The new law and regulations
were designed to diminish mining-induced surface subsidence
and regulate its consequences; 123 their effect was to generally
prohibit the mining of fifty percent of the coal beneath vari-
ous structures and lands, including dwellings, non-commercial
public buildings and cemeteries. 124 These prohibitions made
the unmineable coal essentially useless to its owners, and the
question was whether the law and regulations, on their face,
violated the constitutional prohibition on takings without just
compensation. 125
In upholding the new anti-subsidence program, the
Court's central task was to distinguish the superficially similar
case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.121 In Mahon, Penn-
sylvania's earlier anti-subsidence statute was held invalid be-
cause it "did not disclose a public interest sufficient to war-
rant" the extent of invasion of the coal owners' rights. In
addition, the Court had written in Mahon, as dictum, that
"[t]o make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal
has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as
appropriating or destroying it.' 27 The Court found the crucial
121. See supra text accompanying notes 53-62.
122. The Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 52, §§ 1406.1-.21 (Purdon Supp. 1987), and the regulations thereunder. Key-
stone, 107 S. Ct. at 1236-37.
123. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1237-38.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1239. The case also presented a claim under the contracts clause, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 10, which was rejected by the Court.
126. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
127. Id. at 414-15. The Court in Keystone described this portion of Mahon as an
"advisory opinion." Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1241.
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distinction between Mahon and Keystone in their differing
"particular facts ' 12 8 as analyzed in terms of the two-alterna-
tives formulation.1 29
One "particular fact," which distinguished Keystone from
Mahon in a fundamental way, was that the complaining mine
owners in Keystone had "not even claimed, at this stage, that
the Act makes it commercially impracticable for them to con-
tinue mining their bituminous coal interests in western Penn-
sylvania."130 Accordingly, Keystone did not present the Court
with any occasion to apply the Mahon dictum on commercial
impracticability quoted above. In terms of the two-alterna-
tives formulation, there was no factual basis for deciding one
way or the other whether the subsidence regulations actually
deprived the complaining mine owners of "economically viable
use" of their property.131 The Court suggested that this lack
of essential proof was enough by itself for the coal owners'
"taking" claim to fail.132 Nevertheless, the Court also consid-
ered at some length the public purpose of the subsidence
regulation.
In both Mahon and in Keystone the Court accepted that
the statutes at issue would, respectively, advance legitimate
state interests, as required under the first prong of the two-
alternatives formulation.13 3 The difference lay in the vastly
128. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1236.
129. Id. at 1242.
130. Id. at 1247-48. The case came to the Supreme Court after the District Court
granted summary judgment to the state's representatives on a facial challenge to the
Subsidence Act. Id. at 1246. The Supreme Court had no evidence that there was any
coal, otherwise extractable, that could not be mined at a profit as a result of the
challenged governmental action. Id. at 1248.
131. Thus, Keystone represents another in a series of takings cases which came
to the Court not quite ripe for determination. E.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
Yolo County, 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n
v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Recla-
mation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
132. "In this case, by contrast, petitioners have not shown any deprivation signif-
icant enough to satisfy the heavy burden placed upon one alleging a regulatory tak-
ing. For this reason, their takings claim must fail." Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1246.
133. See supra text accompanying note 30. As Holmes wrote in Mahon: "This is
the case of a single private house. No doubt there is a public interest even in this, as
there is in every purchase and sale and in all that happens within the common-
wealth." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 373, 413 (1922) (emphasis added).
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different magnitude of the public interests in the two cases.
The Keystone opinion described Mahon as involving a bal-
ancing of merely private interests against other private inter-
ests'34 and, as Holmes had written, "the public interest does
not warrant much of this kind of interference."' 3 5 This defla-
tion of the interest served by the Mahon statute paved the
way for Holmes' conclusion that "the statute does not disclose
a public interest sufficient to warrant so extensive a destruc-
tion of the defendant's constitutionally protected rights."' 6
By contrast, the Keystone statute was "designed to accom-
plish a number of widely varying interests."' 37 The Court in
Keystone made no explicit statement, similar to that in
Mahon, that the weight of the public's interest was enough to
justify the impairment of private property resulting from the
fifty percent mining prohibition, but that was the clear
implication.
It is not surprising, in the post-economic due process era,
that the Court in Keystone found a sufficient public interest
to justify the private imposition. 38 What is interesting, how-
ever, is the Court's explicit acknowledgement of the pre-1938
approach that it took to this quintessentially economic due
process issue:
In Keystone, the Court observed that the legislature found "important public inter-
ests" were served by the subsidence regulations, and that there was nothing in the
statutory details to "call the stated public purposes into question." Keystone, 107 S.
Ct. at 1242-43, 1243 n.16.
134. Viz. the coal owners versus the surface owners. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at
1242-43. The Keystone Court did not mention the portion of Holmes' opinion which
stated that even the public interest in securing subjacent support for the public
streets would not justify imposition on private interests effected by the Mahon stat-
ute. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414-15.
135. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413.
136. Id. at 414.
137. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1243. The opinion referred to environmental con-
cerns, health, safety and general welfare concerns, and abatement of nuisance-like
conditions. Id. at 1238-39, 1242, 1244.
Perhaps significantly, the action to enforce the statute in Mahon was brought by
private owners whereas the enforcement contested in Keystone was by the state
itself.
138. E.g., "when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared
in terms well-nigh conclusive." Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954). See supra
text accompanying notes 4-14.
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Pennsylvania Coal instructs courts to examine the opera-
tive provisions of a statute, not just its stated purpose, in
assessing its true nature. . . . In this case, we . . . have
conducted the same type of inquiry the Court in Penn-
sylvania Coal conducted, and have determined that the
details of the statute do not call the stated purpose into
question.139
This language leaves little doubt that the Court views the
"advancing state interests" prong of the two-alternatives for-
mulation as a warrant to actively review the rationality of leg-
islation and its suitability for a public purpose."'4 Although
the Court saw itself as undertaking this review in order to de-
termine a "takings" challenge, it is noteworthy that the por-
tion of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon cited by the Court in
the above quotation was not the "advisory" portion on takings
but rather the holding itself - a holding whose analysis was
of the traditional substantive due process genre.""
It was, of course, almost inevitable that traces of the pre-
1938 substantive due process method would appear in Key-
stone. The superficial similarity of Keystone to the landmark
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon practically required that the
earlier case be distinguished on its own terms, even if the era
of traditional economic due process had passed. Keystone is
not, however, an isolated case which, contrary to the modern
trend of "takings" cases, bears an atavistic seed of substantive
due process concerns. As already described, the Court under-
took the same judicial review of legislative rationality and
suitability in Hodel v. Irving.42 However, in Nollan v. Cali-
139. Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1243, n.16 (emphasis added).
140. Whatever doubt might have remained was dispelled by Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n. See infra text accompanying notes 144-59.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 26-52. Similarly, in referring to the limi-
tations on the proper scope of judicial review for these purposes, the Court cited the
highly economic due process oriented discussion in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388-89 (1926), concluding: "That a land use regulation may be
somewhat overinclusive or underinclusive is, of course, no justification for rejecting
it." Keystone, 107 S. Ct. at 1243 n.16 (emphasis added).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 85-112.
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fornia Coastal Comm'n,143 decided at the end of the 1986
Term, the Court gives the clearest signal yet that it is pre-
pared to actively consider the rationality and suitability of
legislative measures.
B. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission
The issue in Nollan was whether the state could constitu-
tionally require private owners, the Nollans, to grant an ease-
ment to the public as a condition of a building permit. 4 4 The
Nollans sought the permit because they wanted to replace the
house on their oceanfront land. The public easement to be ex-
acted from the Nollans was to run along the ocean, facilitating
public passage down the beach. After the building permit was
issued subject to the objectionable easement condition, the
Nollans sought relief from the condition in mandamus. The
Supreme Court agreed that the condition was constitutionally
invalid and should be struck." 5
In its analysis, the Court initially observed that there
would be "no doubt" that there was a taking if the state had
"simply required" the Nollans to dedicate a beachfront ease-
ment to the public."4 The question was whether it would alter
the outcome that the easement requirement was imposed as a
condition to a building permit. Although the Court addressed
this question in terms of the two-alternatives test, 47 the
Court confined its discussion to the "legitimate state inter-
143. 107 S. Ct. 3141 (1987).
144. Id. at 3143.
145. The applicants filed a petition for administrative mandamus requesting that
the Superior Court declare the easement condition invalid. The writ of mandamus
was granted and the permit condition was struck. The Court of Appeals reversed the
Superior Court. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 177 Cal. App. 3d 719, 223 Cal.
Rptr. 28 (1986). The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals,
reinstating the mandamus which struck the condition. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3143-44,
3150.
146. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3145. Quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982), the Court wrote that "where a governmen-
tal action results in '[a] permanent physical occupation' of the property, by the gov-
ernment itself or by others ... our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent
of the occupation." It concluded in Nollan that a "permanent and continuous" right
of passage would constitute a "permanent physical occupation" for this purpose. Id.
147. No~lan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146.
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ests" alternative. Apparently no one even claimed that either
the easement condition or the public easement itself would
deny the Nollans "economically viable use" of their land. It
was enough, however, to invalidate the easement condition
that it failed to substantially advance the alleged "legitimate
state interests," viz. to preserve the public's view of the
beach. 18
Though the Court concluded that the easement condition
in Nollan was unconstitutional, it would not be strictly accu-
rate to say that the state's action was held to constitute a
"taking" in any way. The fact that the Court did not identify
any particular acts which constituted a taking is perhaps the
most interesting analytical feature of the case.
The building permit requirement itself was not, of course,
a taking. 49 Indeed, the Commission could probably have con-
stitutionally prohibited new construction on the Nollans' lot
altogether. 150 Nor would it constitute a taking that the permit
to build was conditioned on the Nollans' granting a public
easement: "[A] permit condition that serves the same legiti-
mate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the permit
should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the
permit would not constitute a taking." 151 Even a permit condi-
tion requiring a concession of property rights, including the
right to exclude others from the property, would not necessa-
rily effectuate a taking.1 52
148. Id. at 3148.
149. "A requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain
use of his or her property does not itself 'take' the property in any sense." United
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 127 (1985).
150. "[Tlhe Commission unquestionably would be able to deny the Nollans their
permit outright if their new house ... would substantially impede [permissible pub-
lic] purposes, unless the denial would interfere so drastically with [the Nollans' use]
as to constitute a taking." Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3147.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 3148. "[Tlhe Commission's assumed power to forbid construction of
the house in order to protect the public's view of the beach must surely include the
power to condition construction upon some concession by the owner, even a conces-
sion of property rights, that serves the same end." Id. Cf. PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), which upheld against a takings clause challenge,
a state requirement that shopping center owners allow access to shopping center
property for purposes of public expression.
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According to the Court, the constitutional deficiency in
the state's action in Nollan was that "the condition substi-
tuted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end ad-
vanced as the justification for the prohibition. ... The lack of
nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the
building restriction converts that purpose into something
other than what it was."' 53 In other words, the concern was
not that the state's actions served no "legitimate state inter-
ests," nor that they effectuated a taking - the Court never
says that there was a taking. The concern was rather that the
burden imposed by the state was not sufficiently tailored to
the state interest purportedly sought to be advanced.
A striking feature of the Nollan opinion is its lengthy ex-
egesis"" on whether the state's action was "reasonably related
to the public need or burden. 1' 55 Even more striking, however,
is the Court's assertion that in the "takings field" the stan-
dards for deciding this reasonable relationship issue are signif-
icantly more stringent than those applicable to economic due
process or equal protection challenges.5 ' In takings cases,
wrote the Court, "we have required that legislation 'substan-
tially advance' the 'legitimate state interest' sought to be
achieved, . . . not that the State 'could rationally have de-
cided' the measure adopted might achieve the State's objec-
tive.' ,157 The Court specifically rejects, in other words, the
ideal5 " that the degree of judicial deference associated since
1938 with economic due process claims should also apply to
judicial review of the "advancing state interests" factor under
the two-alternatives formulation. Accordingly, whenever gov-
ernmental action impinges on property rights enough to in-
voke a takings analysis, a substantially less deferential judicial
153. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3148 (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 3148-50.
155. Id. at 3148.
156. Id. at 3147.
157. Id. (citations omitted). This language from Nollan confirms that the Court
was doing exactly what it said it was doing when, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n
v. DeBenedictis, it stated that it had conducted "the same type of inquiry the Court
in Pennsylvania Coal conducted." Id. at 1243 n.16 (1987).
158. Which was propounded in Justice Brennan's dissent. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at
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review as to "rationality" is now available.
In summary, Nollan was a case in which the state's at-
tempted action would have deprived private owners of some
use of their land and, because the deprivation would not sub-
stantially advance the state's asserted objective, it was held to
be constitutionally infirm. The Court agreed that the condi-
tion was invalid, but it did not hold that the imposition of the
condition or any other aspect of the case resulted in a
taking.'59
C. Reconciling Keystone Bituminous and Nollan
The main operative difference between Keystone and
Nollan lay in the extent to which, under the Court's analysis,
the governmental actions at issue substantially advanced le-
gitimate state interests. In Keystone, after examining "the op-
erative provisions of the statute, not just its stated pur-
pose,"'160 the Court held that the statute "plainly seeks to
further" a substantial public interest. 6' In Nollan, by con-
trast, the court found that the private owners' deprivation
would not substantially advance the state's asserted objective.
159. The closest the Court comes to identifying a potential "taking" under the
Nollan facts is its implication that the state's program amounted to "an out-and-out
plan of extortion." Id. at 3148. Thus, if the Nollans had actually conveyed the public
easement pursuant to the condition in their permit, the result could be viewed to be
the functional equivalent of a taking, despite that fact that the conveyance was tech-
nically volitional. Obviously, the objectives of the just compensation clause could be
totally undercut if a state could evade its mandate by extorting "voluntary" convey-
ances of desired assets from their erstwhile owners.
What the Court found in Nollan, however, was not an extorted conveyance that
was functionally equivalent to a taking, but an attempt by the state to evade the
mandate of the takings clause and acquire property without paying for it. The Court
did not invalidate the state's prospective acquisition of the easement as violative of
the just compensation clause, but rather it invalidated the state's already completed
action, viz. the imposition of the condition. Although the imposition of the condition
implicated the just compensation clause, its real constitutional deficiency was that it
was outside of the government's power to impose the condition. The reason that im-
posing the condition was outside of the government's power was that the government
has no "legitimate" interest in acquiring assets without paying for them and, thus,
imposition of the condition did not serve a legitimate state interest. Id. at 3148.
160. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1243
n.16 (1987).
161. Id. at 1246.
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It is clear that, at least in Nollan, the Court undertook an
active judicial review of whether the challenged governmental
action was rationally suited for the promotion of its intended
purpose.
VIII. Conclusion
In recent constitutional challenges to governmental ac-
tions alleged to constitute takings without just compensation,
the Supreme Court appears to have settled upon two fairly
fixed analytical approaches for deciding whether or not a
"taking" was involved. The considerations invoked by these
two analytical approaches are typically recited by the Court
as, respectively, a three-factor framework or a formulation of
two-alternative tests. The composition of these considerations
as fairly fixed approaches to takings analysis can be traced to
the 1978 case of Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City.
As presented in Penn Central, the underlying considera-
tions appear to be essentially similar for both approaches, de-
spite their different wording. Both consider whether the gov-
ernment's action has a particularly harsh economic effect on a
private owner's property. Moreover, both have provision -
explicit in the case of the two-alternatives formulation - for
considering whether the government's action is a rational
measure for addressing a legitimate public purpose. The latter
consideration, variously described as going to the "charac-
ter"'62 of the governmental action or to whether the action
"advances state interests"' 63 is of particular interest. Both the
genesis of this public nexus factor6 4 and the use which the
Court has made of it suggest that the just compensation re-
quirement is being put to service as a basis for judicial review
of the rationality of economic legislation.
It may be still too early to conclude that recent cases like
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n and Hodel v. Irving
mark the beginnings of a swing back to the pre-1938 style of
judicial review in economic matters. First, the Court seems
162. See supra text accompanying notes 105-12.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 119-61.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 53-62.
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still far from explicitly reversing its post-1938 attitude of def-
erence to the legislature in the economic area. Even the au-
thor of the Nollan opinion, Justice Scalia, wrote only weeks
earlier in a commerce clause case that an evaluation of the
"putative local benefits" of a statute is "an inquiry . . . ill
suited to the judicial function and should be undertaken
rarely if at all."' 5 Second, some passages in the Nollan opin-
ion imply that the Nollan facts were extreme, viz. that the
supposed connection between state's asserted purpose and its
action in pursuit of that purpose was beyond any imaginable
rationality. '66 Third, the Court expressed concern that Nollan
involved an "actual conveyance" of property, entailing a
"heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compen-
sation requirement.' 167
At the same time, however, there is ample reason - espe-
cially in the Nollan opinion - to believe that the Court is
again willing to undertake expanded economic review of legis-
lation. Foremost, the Court stated in Nollan that the verbal
formulations expressing the standards applicable in the tak-
ings field "have generally been quite different" from those ap-
plied to due process claims.' 68 In other words, in the future
165. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1652 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring). In the CTS case, the Court rejected a dormant commerce
clause challenge to a state statute intended to discourage tender offers (including in-
terstate tender offers) for corporate control. In determining whether a state law
causes an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, one recognized factor is
whether the statute's burden on commerce "is clearly excessive in relation to the pu-
tative local benefits." Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). Justice
Scalia concurred with the majority's holding but, for the reason quoted in the text, he
objected to the majority's consideration of the "putative local benefits" factor.
166. The Court wrote twice that it was "impossible to understand" the connec-
tion between the purpose and the action, Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3149, and that "this
case does not meet even the most untailored standards." Id. at 3148. At another
point, the Court implied that, in Nollan, the condition imposed "utterly fails to fur-
ther the end advanced." Id. (emphasis added).
At least three of the justices felt, however, that a rational relationship could have
existed between the state's action in imposing the condition and its purpose of pre-
serving the public's view of the shoreline. See opinions of Justice Brennan (joined by
Justice Marshall) and Justice Blackmun. Id. at 3150, 3162.
167. Id. at 3150.
168. Id. at 3147 n.3. From the citations (Williams v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483
(1955) and Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952)), it is evident
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less deference will be given in cases where property is alleg-
edly taken by a governmental act. The Nollan Court affirmed,
moreover, that it "view[s] the Fifth Amendment's property
clause to be more than a pleading requirement,"' 9 meaning
that it would look behind announced governmental purposes
to determine the real purposes of governmental acts - as it
said it would in Keystone Bituminous7 0 and it openly did in
Nollan.'7 1 Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the Court
stressed that the state could abridge property rights through
the police power only if doing so would result in a "'substan-
tial advanc[ing]' of a legitimate State interest."'72
From the Court's analytical approach and its own state-
ments it appears fair to conclude that traditional economic
due process review was at least a part of what the Supreme
Court was doing in several of its takings cases decided during
the 1986 Term. Whether such scrutiny of legislative rational-
ity under the takings clause will evolve into a full return to
the more probing style of judicial review of pre-1938 period
remains to be seen.
that the Court is referring to the difference between current takings clause standards
and the standards applicable in post-1938 economic due process jurisprudence.
The Court also made a critical reference to Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962), as a case which the Court believed to more or less equate - errone-
ously - the economic due process inquiry with the inquiry for purposes of takings
determinations. As noted previously, however, the issue argued and decided in Gold-
blatt was precisely economic due process - not "taking" as such - and it was there-
fore natural that Goldblatt used the post-1938 economic due process "deference" ap-
proach. See supra note 43.
169. Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3150.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 121-43.
171. The conclusion reached by looking behind the putative purpose in Nollan
was "[t]he lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the build-
ing restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was." Nollan,
107 S. Ct. at 3148 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 3150 (emphasis in original).
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